Anti-Forensics
Account Misuse
Clear Browser Artifacts
Clear Email Artifacts
Decrease Privileges
Delayed Execution Triggers
Delete User Account
Deletion of Volume Shadow Copy
Disk Wiping
File Deletion
File Encryption
Hide Artifacts
Hiding or Destroying Command History
Log Deletion
Log Modification
Modify Windows Registry
Network Obfuscation
Physical Destruction of Storage Media
Physical Removal of Disk Storage
Stalling
Steganography
System Shutdown
Timestomping
Tripwires
Uninstalling Software
Virtualization
Windows System Time Modification
- ID: AF022.002
- Created: 20th May 2025
- Updated: 01st November 2025
- Platform: Windows
- MITRE ATT&CK®: T1564.006T1564
- Contributor: Ryan Bellows
Use of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
The subject leverages Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) to contain forensic artifacts within a Linux-like runtime environment embedded in Windows. By operating inside WSL, the subject avoids writing sensitive data, tool activity, or command history to traditional Windows locations, significantly reducing visibility to host-based forensic and security tools.
WSL creates a logical Linux environment that appears separate from the Windows file system. Although some host-guest integration exists, activity within WSL often bypasses standard Windows event logging, registry updates, and process tracking. This allows the subject to execute scripts, use Unix-native tools, stage exfiltration, or decrypt payloads with minimal footprint on the host.
Example Scenarios:
- The subject downloads and processes sensitive files inside the WSL environment using native Linux tools (e.g.,
scp,gpg,rsync), preventing access and modification timestamps from appearing in Windows Explorer or standard audit logs. - A subject extracts and stages exfiltration material in
/mnt/cwithin WSL, using symbolic links and Linux file permissions to obscure its presence from Windows search and indexing services. - WSL is used to execute recon and credential-harvesting scripts (e.g.,
nmap,hydra,sshenumeration tools), with no execution trace in Windows Event Logs. - Upon completion of activity, the subject deletes the WSL distribution, leaving minimal residue on the host system—especially if no antivirus or EDR coverage extends into the WSL layer.
Preventions (4)
Detections (8)
MITRE ATT&CK® Mapping (2)
ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix Version 18.1