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Insider Threat Matrix™

  • ID: MT012.001
  • Created: 26th July 2024
  • Updated: 25th April 2025
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Social Engineering (Inbound)

A third party deceptively manipulates and/or persuades a subject to divulge information, or gain access to devices or systems, or to otherwise cause harm or undermine a target organization.

Prevention

ID Name Description
PV039Employee Mental Health & Support Program

Offering mental health support and conflict resolution programs to
help employees identify and report manipulative behavior in the
workplace

PV042Employee Vulnerability Support Program

A structured program, including a helpline or other reporting mechanism, designed to assist employees who feel vulnerable, whether due to personal issues, coercion, or extortion. This process allows employees to confidentially raise concerns with trusted teams, such as Human Resources or other qualified professionals. In some cases, it may be appropriate to discreetly share this information with trusted individuals within the Insider Risk Management Program to help prevent and detect insider threats while also providing necessary support to the employee.

PV012End-User Security Awareness Training

Mandatory security awareness training for employees can help them to recognize a range of cyber attacks that they can play a part in preventing or detecting. This can include topics such as phishing, social engineering, and data classification, amongst others.

PV054Human Resources Collaboration for Early Threat Detection

Implement a process whereby HR data and observations, including those from managers and colleagues, can be securely communicated in a timely manner to investigators, triggering proactive monitoring of potential insider threats early in their lifecycle. Collaboration between HR teams, managers, colleagues, and investigators is essential for detecting concerning behaviors or changes in an employee's personal circumstances that could indicate an increased risk of insider threat.

 

Mental Health and Personal Struggles

  • Trigger Event: HR receives reports or observes a significant change in an employee's behavior or performance, which may indicate mental health issues or personal struggles that could elevate the likelihood of an insider threat. This information may come from managers, colleagues, or direct observations within HR.
  • Indicator: Multiple reports from managers, direct supervisors, or colleagues highlighting behavior changes such as stress, depression, or erratic actions.
  • Response: HR teams should notify investigators of high-risk employees with visible signs of distress or any reported instances that might indicate susceptibility to manipulation or exploitation.

 

Negative Statements or Discontent with the Company

  • Trigger Event: HR identifies instances of employees making negative statements about the company, its leadership, or its operations, potentially through personal social media channels, internal communications, or third-party reports. Additionally, such concerns might be raised by managers or colleagues.
  • Indicator: Recorded incidents where employees voice dissatisfaction in forums or interactions that may expose vulnerabilities within the company, which may come from colleagues, managers, or HR’s internal channels.
  • Response: Immediate referral to investigators for further investigation, including tracking if such sentiments are coupled with any increase in risky behaviors (e.g., accessing sensitive data or systems without authorization).

 

Excessive Financial Purchases (Potential Embezzlement or Third-Party Influence)

  • Trigger Event: HR or finance teams notice discrepancies in an employee's personal financial behavior—particularly excessive spending patterns that appear inconsistent with their known salary or financial profile. This could indicate embezzlement, financial mismanagement, or payments from third parties. Such concerns may also be raised by managers or colleagues.
  • Indicator: Transactions that show a high degree of personal spending or financial behavior inconsistent with the employee’s compensation, possibly flagged by HR, finance, or colleagues who notice unusual behaviors.
  • Response: Referral to investigators for correlation with employee access to financial or sensitive company systems, along with further scrutiny of potential illicit financial transactions. Third-party or whistleblower reports, including from colleagues or managers, may also be investigated as part of a broader risk assessment.

 

Hearsay and Indirect Reports

  • Trigger Event: Anonymous or informal reports—such as rumors or gossip circulating in the workplace—that hint at potential insider threat behaviors. These reports, often from colleagues or managers, may be unsubstantiated, but they still warrant an alert if the volume or credibility of the information increases.
  • Indicator: Reports or concerns raised by employees, colleagues, or external parties suggesting that an employee may be engaging in unusual behaviors, such as excessive contact with external vendors, financial irregularities, or internal dissatisfaction.
  • Response: Investigators work with HR to assess the situation by cross-referencing any concerns, including those from colleagues or managers, with the employee's activity patterns, communication, and access to sensitive systems.

 

Implementation Considerations

  • Collaboration Framework: A clear and secure protocol for HR, managers, colleagues, and investigators to share critical information regarding employees at risk. This should maintain employee privacy and legal protections, while still enabling timely alerts.
  • Confidentiality and Privacy: All information related to personal behavior, health, or financial matters must be handled with sensitivity and in accordance with legal and regulatory frameworks, such as GDPR or local privacy laws.
  • Continuous Monitoring: Once flagged, employees should be monitored for any other risk indicators, including changes in data access patterns, unapproved system access, or behavior that correlates with identified risks.
PV038Insider Threat Awareness Training

Training should equip employees to recognize manipulation tactics, such as social engineering and extortion, that are used to coerce actions and behaviors harmful to the individual and/or the organization. The training should also encourage and guide participants on how to safely report any instances of coercion.

PV022Internal Whistleblowing

Provide a process for all staff members to report concerning and/or suspicious behaviour to the organization's security team for review. An internal whistleblowing process should take into consideration the privacy of the reporter and the subject(s) of the report, with specific regard to safeguarding against reprisals against reporters.

Detection

ID Name Description
DT045Agent Capable of User Activity Monitoring

An agent capable of User Activity Monitoring (UAM) is a software agent installed on organization endpoints (such as laptops); typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user Is expected to conduct the activity.

 

The User Activity Monitoring agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, with a focus on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. The purpose of this monitoring is to identify undesirable and/or malicious activity being conducted by a human user (in this context, an Insider Threat).

 

Typical User Activity Monitoring platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic correlation against a rule set. This rule set is used to surface activity that may represent Insider Threat related activity such as capturing screenshots, copying data, compressing files or installing risky software.

 

Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) platforms.

DT047Agent Capable of User Behaviour Analytics

An agent capable of User Behaviour Analytics (UBA) is a software agent installed on organizational endpoints (such as laptops). Typically, User Activity Monitoring agents are only deployed on endpoints where a human user is expected to conduct the activity.

 

The User Behaviour Analytics agent will typically record Operating System, application, and network activity occurring on an endpoint, focusing on activity that is or can be conducted by a human user. Typically, User Behaviour Analytics platforms operate in an agent/server model where activity logs are sent to a server for automatic analysis. In the case of User Behaviour Analytics, this analysis will typically be conducted against a baseline that has previously been established.

 

A User Behaviour Analytic platform will typically conduct a period of ‘baselining’ when the platform is first installed. This baselining period establishes the normal behavior parameters for an organization’s users, which are used to train a Machine Learning (ML) model. This ML model can then be later used to automatically identify activity that is predicted to be an anomaly, which is hoped to surface user behavior that is undesirable, risky, or malicious.

 

Other platforms providing related functionality are frequently referred to as User Activity Monitoring (UAM) platforms.

DT041Email Gateway

Email gateway solutions offer the ability to trace inbound and outbound emails to an organization. This can be used to retrieve information such as emails sent or received, the subject line, content, attachments, timestamps, and recipients.

DT107Microsoft Teams Admin Center Meeting and Call History

From the Microsoft Teams admin center, it is possible to review previous Teams meetings or calls that a user account has joined. These logs include key information such as meeting or call ID, start time, duration, and participants. The purpose of this information is to assist with troubleshooting meeting or call issues; however, investigators can use it to determine when user accounts have participated in meetings or calls.

 

The following URL can be used to view this activity log, provided the investigator's account has the Microsoft Teams Administrator role assigned, or a role with higher privileges: https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/dashboard

Select Users, Manage Users, then the account being investigated. Click on Meetings & Calls, then scroll to the bottom of the page to view the Past Meetings table. Clicking on a meeting or call ID will provide more detailed information.