detections
- ID: DT107
- Created: 14th December 2024
- Updated: 14th December 2024
- Contributor: The ITM Team
Microsoft Teams Admin Center Meeting and Call History
From the Microsoft Teams admin center, it is possible to review previous Teams meetings or calls that a user account has joined. These logs include key information such as meeting or call ID, start time, duration, and participants. The purpose of this information is to assist with troubleshooting meeting or call issues; however, investigators can use it to determine when user accounts have participated in meetings or calls.
The following URL can be used to view this activity log, provided the investigator's account has the Microsoft Teams Administrator role assigned, or a role with higher privileges: https://admin.teams.microsoft.com/dashboard
Select Users, Manage Users, then the account being investigated. Click on Meetings & Calls, then scroll to the bottom of the page to view the Past Meetings table. Clicking on a meeting or call ID will provide more detailed information.
Sections
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| IF021 | Harassment and Discrimination | A subject engages in unauthorized conduct that amounts to harassment or discriminatory behavior within the workplace, targeting individuals or groups based on protected characteristics, such as race, gender, religion, or other personal attributes. Incidents of harassment and discrimination may expose the organization to legal risks, potential reputational damage, and regulatory penalties. Additionally, individuals affected by such behavior may be at higher risk of retaliating or disengaging from their work, potentially leading to further insider risks. |
| ME018 | Aiding and Abetting | A subject has access to assistance from one or more individuals who knowingly support or enable their ability to undertake an infringement against an organization. These individuals may provide access to systems, devices, information, physical locations, or other resources that would otherwise be unavailable or difficult for the subject to obtain independently.
Assistance may involve sharing credentials, providing technical expertise, facilitating access to restricted environments, disclosing internal procedures, or using organizational privileges or relationships to support the subject's activities. The individuals providing assistance may be members of the organization or external parties with relevant access, knowledge, or capabilities.
The involvement of additional individuals may expand the subject's effective capabilities beyond those associated with their own assigned access or organizational position. Establishing the nature of this assistance is relevant when assessing the resources available to the subject and the potential involvement of collaborators in an infringement. |
| PR022 | Social Engineering (Outbound) | A subject deliberately uses deception, manipulation, or misleading representations to influence another individual into disclosing information, granting access, performing an action, or circumventing organizational procedures in preparation for a subsequent infringement. The subject initiates or directs the interaction to obtain information, assistance, or capabilities that would otherwise be unavailable or restricted.
Outbound social engineering may occur through email, telephone or voice communications, SMS and messaging platforms, or direct in-person interactions. The subject may impersonate trusted individuals, misrepresent their authority or business requirements, create false urgency, or exploit established professional relationships to influence the recipient's decisions.
These activities may enable the subject to obtain authentication credentials, sensitive documents, access approvals, internal process information, or assistance in bypassing organizational controls. |
| IF034 | Exfiltration via Automated Transcription | Exfiltration via automated transcription refers to the capture and conversion of spoken information into structured, persistent data through the use of transcription technologies, including AI-enabled note-taking tools, meeting assistants, and speech-to-text systems.
Unlike traditional media capture techniques, this behavior does not merely reproduce information, it transforms ephemeral verbal communication into searchable, shareable, and analyzable content. This significantly increases the utility and scalability of exfiltrated data, enabling subjects to accumulate large volumes of sensitive information over time with minimal manual effort.
This technique may occur using external tools operating outside organizational control or through misuse of approved or embedded transcription capabilities within enterprise platforms. As a result, it spans both out-of-band and in-band exfiltration paths, making it distinct from media capture behaviors.
In addition to software-based transcription tools, subjects may leverage dedicated or repurposed hardware to capture audio streams for later transcription or processing. This includes the use of intermediary devices capable of intercepting microphone input or headphone output, such as inline audio capture adapters, modified peripherals, or secondary recording devices connected to audio interfaces.
These methods enable the subject to capture high-quality audio directly from system inputs or outputs without relying on visible applications or introducing detectable software artifacts. In such cases, audio may be recorded covertly and later processed through transcription tools outside the organizational environment, further separating the point of capture from the point of transformation and exfiltration.
Exfiltration via automated transcription is particularly effective in environments where sensitive information is frequently communicated verbally, including strategic discussions, incident response, legal proceedings, and technical collaboration. The presence of this behavior may indicate deliberate collection of high-value conversational intelligence, especially where transcription outputs are retained, aggregated, or transferred beyond approved boundaries.
From an investigative perspective, this technique introduces a shift from event-based capture to continuous collection, where subjects build structured datasets over time. Detection therefore relies on identifying tool usage, data flows, and the presence of generated artifacts, rather than isolated capture events. |
| PR050 | Trusted Relationship Cultivation | A subject deliberately develops a relationship of trust with a colleague, administrator, service provider, customer, or control owner to obtain future assistance, information, approval, or reduced scrutiny.
The conduct may involve repeatedly offering help, volunteering for tasks, creating dependency, demonstrating apparent reliability, or establishing informal communication outside approved processes. The relationship is later used to secure exceptional access, accelerate a request, obtain confidential information, bypass verification, or discourage challenge.
This would not classify ordinary professional relationship-building. Investigative relevance arises where the relationship is developed or exploited to enable a subsequent infringement. |
| IF044 | Abuse of Decision-Making Authority | A subject deliberately uses a decision-making authority granted through their organizational role to approve, deny, waive, prioritize, suppress, or otherwise determine an outcome for an unauthorized purpose.
The subject may be technically and procedurally entitled to make the decision. The infringement arises because the authority is exercised contrary to the organization’s interests, applicable policy, delegated limits, or the legitimate purpose for which the authority was granted.
This behavior may be difficult to identify through conventional access-control monitoring because the subject acts through authorized workflows and assigned permissions. Investigation requires examination of the decision, its stated justification, the subject’s relationship to affected parties, applicable policy requirements, and comparable decisions made under similar circumstances.
This is narrower than general “authority abuse.” It focuses on the improper exercise of an entrusted decision right. |
| PR056 | Offering Insider Services to Third Parties | A subject actively seeks opportunities to participate in an infringement on behalf of an external party by advertising, offering, or communicating their willingness to misuse organizational access, information, or position of trust. This may involve posting on underground forums, responding to recruitment advertisements, or approaching individuals through social media, messaging platforms, or other communication channels.
The subject may disclose their employment position, access privileges, or potential capabilities to attract interested parties, negotiate compensation, or establish arrangements for subsequent unauthorized activity. |
| PR057 | Meeting Recording and Transcription | A subject uses native meeting platform capabilities or third-party recording and transcription services to capture organizational meetings in preparation for a subsequent infringement. This may involve initiating built-in audio or video recording, enabling automated transcription, or introducing an external meeting bot or AI-powered assistant to record, transcribe, or summarize discussions.
These activities may capture sensitive organizational information, including confidential business discussions, intellectual property, strategic decisions, or other information disclosed verbally or through shared meeting content. Recordings, transcripts, and generated summaries may be retained within the meeting platform, associated cloud storage, or external third-party services, making the information available for subsequent unauthorized access, retrieval, or exfiltration.
The subject may exploit legitimately available recording features or introduce third-party services outside approved organizational processes. The use of these capabilities becomes relevant to an insider threat investigation where the capture or retention of meeting content is unauthorized or associated with preparation for a subsequent infringement. |
| MT012.001 | Social Engineering (Inbound) | A third party uses deception or manipulation to influence a subject into disclosing organizational information, providing unauthorized access to devices or systems, or undertaking other actions that harm or undermine the organization. The subject may be unaware of the third party's intentions or the potential consequences of their actions. |
| IF044.003 | Improper Preferential Treatment | A subject uses decision-making authority to provide an unauthorized advantage to a person, organization, account, supplier, applicant, or other beneficiary.
Examples include:
|
| IF044.004 | Suppression of Escalation or Review | A subject uses their authority to prevent, terminate, delay, redirect, or improperly narrow a required organizational review, escalation, complaint, referral, or investigation.
Examples include:
|
| IF044.005 | Unauthorized Waiver or Control Exception | A subject improperly waives, bypasses, suspends, or grants an exception to a mandatory organizational control using authority available through their role.
Examples include:
|
| PR055.001 | Insider Collaborator Recruitment | A subject seeks to recruit another person who currently has, or previously had, authorized access to the affected organization’s resources to knowingly assist an infringement or its concealment. The requested assistance may draw on that person’s access, organizational knowledge, decision-making authority, operational responsibilities, or trusted relationships. This may involve obtaining restricted information, providing credentials or physical entry, approving improper transactions, making unauthorized changes, suppressing scrutiny, or recruiting additional participants.
The person approached may be a colleague, manager, direct report, former member of the organization, or trusted third-party personnel. Investigators should establish the person’s relationship with the organization, the assistance sought, and whether the subject communicated its unauthorized purpose. Recruitment of a former member does not establish that they retain access, and recruitment of a privileged individual does not establish that their privileges were subsequently used. A managerial instruction or request for assistance should not be treated as knowing recruitment solely because it later contributes to an infringement. |
| PR056.001 | Advertising Insider Services | A subject proactively advertises or offers their willingness to misuse organizational access, information, resources, or position of trust to facilitate an infringement on behalf of a third party. This may involve publishing offers on underground forums, posting on social media, or directly approaching external individuals or groups seeking opportunities for unauthorized activity.
The subject may disclose details of their organizational affiliation, access privileges, technical capabilities, or the types of information and systems available to them to attract interested parties. Such activity may involve soliciting financial compensation, proposing arrangements for collaboration, or offering access to organizational resources in exchange for other benefits.
The defining characteristic is that the subject initiates the solicitation, positioning themselves as a potential participant in an infringement before any formal agreement or unauthorized activity has occurred. |
| PR056.002 | Responding to Insider Recruitment Opportunities | A subject knowingly responds to recruitment advertisements, solicitations, or offers from third parties seeking individuals willing to misuse their organizational access, information, resources, or position of trust to facilitate an infringement. These opportunities may be encountered on underground forums, social media platforms, messaging services, or through direct communications from external individuals.
The subject may initiate contact with the recruiting party, express interest in participating, disclose their organizational affiliation or access capabilities, or discuss potential activities, compensation, and conditions of involvement. Engagement may progress from an initial expression of interest to more detailed discussions concerning the subject's ability to facilitate unauthorized access, information disclosure, sabotage, or other infringements.
The defining characteristic is the subject's voluntary engagement with an existing recruitment opportunity, rather than independently advertising their services. The behavior may constitute preparatory activity even where no agreement is reached or subsequent infringement occurs. |
| PR057.001 | Recording and Transcription via Native Features | A subject uses built-in recording or transcription capabilities within organizational meeting platforms, such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, or Google Meet, to capture sensitive discussions, information, or decisions in preparation for a subsequent infringement. This may involve initiating audio or video recordings, enabling automated transcription, or using native AI-powered meeting assistants to generate transcripts and summaries.
These capabilities may produce recordings, searchable transcripts, or meeting summaries containing confidential business discussions, intellectual property, or other sensitive organizational information. The resulting artifacts may be retained within the meeting platform or associated cloud storage services, allowing the subject to subsequently access, download, or transfer the captured information.
The defining characteristic is the use of functionality provided directly by the meeting platform, rather than an independent recording service or external meeting participant. |
| PR057.002 | Recording and Transcription via Meeting Bots | A subject introduces or authorizes a third-party meeting bot or AI-powered recording assistant to join an organizational meeting and capture spoken communications, shared content, or other sensitive information in preparation for a subsequent infringement. These services may join meetings as identifiable participants and independently record, transcribe, or summarize discussions.
The subject may use services such as Otter.ai, Fireflies.ai, or similar meeting assistants to capture information outside the native recording capabilities of the meeting platform. Recordings, transcripts, and AI-generated summaries may be processed or retained within external services, potentially placing sensitive organizational information outside approved storage and security controls.
The defining characteristic is the introduction of an additional automated meeting participant that captures meeting content independently of the platform's native recording and transcription functionality. |