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Insider Threat Matrix™

  • ID: PV024
  • Created: 19th June 2024
  • Updated: 19th June 2024
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Employee Off-boarding Process

When an employee leaves the organization, a formal process should be followed to ensure all equipment is returned, and any associated accounts or access is revoked.

Sections

ID Name Description
ME021Unrevoked Access

The subject has left the organization but still has access to services or data that is reserved for employees.

MT003Leaver

A subject leaving the organisation with access to sensitive data with the intent to access and exfiltrate sensitive data or otherwise contravene internal policies.

MT002Mover

A subject moves within the organisation to a different team with the intent to gain access to sensitive data or to circumvent controls or to otherwise contravene internal policies.

ME021.001User Account Credentials

User credentials that were available to the subject during employment are not revoked and can still be used.

ME021.002Web Service Credentials

Web credentials that were available to the subject during employment are not revoked and can still be used.

ME021.003Physical Access Credentials

Physical security credentials, such as an ID card or physical keys, that were available to the subject during employment are not revoked and can still be used.

ME021.004API Keys

API keys that were available to the subject during employment are not revoked and can still be used.

ME021.005SSH Keys

SSH keys that were available to the subject during employment are not revoked and can still be used.

ME021.006Multi-Factor Authentication

Subjects who are issued Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) tokens, whether software-based (such as Google Authenticator or Microsoft Authenticator) or hardware devices (like YubiKeys or FIDO2 devices), may retain access to systems if these tokens or devices are not deactivated upon their departure or role change.

 

When a subject leaves the organization or no longer needs access, failing to deactivate their MFA tokens allows them to continue authenticating to systems, potentially bypassing security controls. If a subject’s software-based MFA token remains active, they can still generate valid authentication codes unless the token is unlinked or deactivated. Similarly, if a subject retains a hardware security key, they can use it to authenticate to services as if they were still an active user.

 

In environments using federated authentication (e.g., SAML, OAuth), a subject’s MFA token can provide access to multiple interconnected services, allowing them to authenticate to systems they should no longer be able to access. This opens the possibility of unauthorized access even after the subject has left the organization.

 

To prevent this, organizations must promptly deactivate MFA tokens when subjects are removed from the network. Automating the deactivation process and regularly auditing active tokens will help close any gaps in access control. Additionally, securely managing backup MFA keys ensures that no unauthorized individual can reuse them.