detections
- ID: DT020
- Created: 31st May 2024
- Updated: 25th July 2024
- Platform: Windows
- Contributor: The ITM Team
Shellbags, USB Removable Storage
Shellbags are a set of Windows registry keys that contain details about a user-viewed folder, such as its size, position, thumbnail, and timestamps. Typically Shellbag information is created for folders that have been opened and closed with Windows File Explorer and default settings adjusted. However, Shellbag information can be created under various situations across different versions of Windows.
Shellbags are located in the following registry keys:
Windows XP
NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRUNTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagsNTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\BagMRUNTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\Bags
Windows 7 and later
NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRUNTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagsUsrClass.dat\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRUUsrClass.dat\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags
Shellbags can disclose information about USB removable storage drives that are connected to the system, disclosing the drive letter and any files that were accessed from the drive.
Sections
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| PR002 | Device Mounting | A subject mounts or attempts to mount removable storage media or network-accessible storage on a target system in preparation for a subsequent infringement. This may involve connecting USB mass storage devices, Secure Digital (SD) cards, floppy disks, optical media, or mounting network shares to establish access to additional storage locations.
Mounting these devices or storage resources may enable the subject to access, collect, store, or transfer organizational information outside its original location. The activity may facilitate data staging, unauthorized file transfers, or subsequent exfiltration, depending on the storage medium, its configuration, and the subject's intended use. |
| ME005 | Removable Media | A subject has the ability to connect, mount, and access removable storage media through an organizational device. This may include USB mass storage devices, Secure Digital (SD) cards, optical discs, floppy disks, or other supported portable storage media capable of holding organizational information.
Access to removable media may enable the subject to read information from external storage devices, copy organizational files onto portable media, or transfer information between systems without relying on network-based communication channels. Where removable storage is permitted or insufficiently restricted, this capability may facilitate unauthorized data collection, staging, or subsequent physical exfiltration. |
| IF002 | Exfiltration via Physical Medium | A subject exfiltrates organizational information through the unauthorized transfer or removal of physical storage media, computing devices, or documents containing organizational information. This may involve copying data to removable storage devices, transferring information between directly connected systems, accessing internal storage drives, or physically removing documents from the organization's control.
Physical exfiltration methods may include USB mass storage devices, optical or floppy disk media, additional internal drives, personal mobile devices, and direct access to a target system's storage. The subject may also remove physical documents containing sensitive or confidential information without converting them into a digital format. |
| PR014.001 | USB Mass Storage Device Formatting | A subject formats a USB mass storage device on a target system with a file system capable of being written to by the target system. |
| IF002.001 | Exfiltration via USB Mass Storage Device | A subject exfiltrates data using a USB-connected mass storage device, such as a USB flash drive or USB external hard-drive. |
| PR002.001 | USB Mass Storage Device Mounting | A subject may attempt to mount a USB Mass Storage device on a target system. |
| ME005.001 | USB Mass Storage | A subject can mount and write to a USB mass storage device. |
| ME005.002 | SD Cards | A subject can mount and write to an SD card, either directly from the system, or through a USB connector. |
| IF002.006 | Exfiltration via USB to USB Data Transfer | A USB to USB data transfer cable is a device designed to connect two computers directly together for the purpose of transferring files between them. These cables are equipped with a small electronic circuit to facilitate data transfer without the need for an intermediate storage device. Typically a USB to USB data transfer cable will require specific software to be installed to facilitate the data transfer. In the context of an insider threat, a USB to USB data transfer cable can be a tool for exfiltrating sensitive data from an organization's environment. |
| AF022.003 | Portable Hypervisors | The subject uses a portable hypervisor to launch a virtual machine from removable media or user-space directories, enabling covert execution of tools, data staging, or operational activities. These hypervisors can run without installation, system-wide configuration changes, or elevated privileges, bypassing standard application control, endpoint detection, and logging.
Portable hypervisors are often used to:
Example Scenarios:
|
| PR004.003 | Removable Media File Exploration | The subject browses, searches, or navigates files stored on removable media to identify data of interest. This includes interaction with external storage devices such as USB flash drives, external hard drives, memory cards, or other mountable media connected to an endpoint.
File exploration on removable media may involve directory traversal, file listing, previewing, or opening files directly from the mounted device. This activity can occur either on media introduced by the subject or on devices previously used for data staging or transfer. |