detections
- ID: DT087
- Created: 25th July 2024
- Updated: 25th July 2024
- Platform: Windows
- Contributor: Joshua Phillips
USB MountPoints2
MountPoints2 is a Windows Registry key used to store information about previously connected removable devices, such as USB drives, CDs, and other external storage media. It is located at:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2
Each subkey under MountPoints2 represents a unique device, often identified by its GUID (Globally Unique Identifier) or other unique identifier.
These subkeys can contain various values that describe the properties and behavior of the corresponding device, such as the assigned drive letter, volume label, and other relevant data.
Sections
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| IF002 | Exfiltration via Physical Medium | A subject exfiltrates organizational information through the unauthorized transfer or removal of physical storage media, computing devices, or documents containing organizational information. This may involve copying data to removable storage devices, transferring information between directly connected systems, accessing internal storage drives, or physically removing documents from the organization's control.
Physical exfiltration methods may include USB mass storage devices, optical or floppy disk media, additional internal drives, personal mobile devices, and direct access to a target system's storage. The subject may also remove physical documents containing sensitive or confidential information without converting them into a digital format. |
| IF002.001 | Exfiltration via USB Mass Storage Device | A subject exfiltrates data using a USB-connected mass storage device, such as a USB flash drive or USB external hard-drive. |
| PR002.001 | USB Mass Storage Device Mounting | A subject may attempt to mount a USB Mass Storage device on a target system. |
| ME005.001 | USB Mass Storage | A subject can mount and write to a USB mass storage device. |
| IF002.006 | Exfiltration via USB to USB Data Transfer | A USB to USB data transfer cable is a device designed to connect two computers directly together for the purpose of transferring files between them. These cables are equipped with a small electronic circuit to facilitate data transfer without the need for an intermediate storage device. Typically a USB to USB data transfer cable will require specific software to be installed to facilitate the data transfer. In the context of an insider threat, a USB to USB data transfer cable can be a tool for exfiltrating sensitive data from an organization's environment. |
| AF022.003 | Portable Hypervisors | The subject uses a portable hypervisor to launch a virtual machine from removable media or user-space directories, enabling covert execution of tools, data staging, or operational activities. These hypervisors can run without installation, system-wide configuration changes, or elevated privileges, bypassing standard application control, endpoint detection, and logging.
Portable hypervisors are often used to:
Example Scenarios:
|
| PR004.003 | Removable Media File Exploration | The subject browses, searches, or navigates files stored on removable media to identify data of interest. This includes interaction with external storage devices such as USB flash drives, external hard drives, memory cards, or other mountable media connected to an endpoint.
File exploration on removable media may involve directory traversal, file listing, previewing, or opening files directly from the mounted device. This activity can occur either on media introduced by the subject or on devices previously used for data staging or transfer. |