• ID: DT128
  • Created: 21st May 2025
  • Updated: 21st May 2025
  • Platform: Windows
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

Microsoft Purview eDiscovery

Investigators can leverage Microsoft Purview eDiscovery to proactively search for indicators of insider threat activity across Microsoft 365 workloads, including Exchange, SharePoint, OneDrive, and Teams. eDiscovery enables targeted, cross-tenant search of user communications and file activity, making it a powerful internal investigation and monitoring tool when used within approved workflows.

 

eDiscovery should be used to:

  • Identify data staging or policy violations involving sensitive or regulated information.
  • Investigate keywords, file types, or behavioral patterns linked to insider misuse.
  • Surface high-risk communication themes (e.g., resignation, exfil intent, coercion signals).
  • Correlate abnormal file sharing, email forwarding, or messaging activity across multiple users or services.

 

Detection Methods (via eDiscovery):

  • Keyword or Pattern-Based Search: Use search queries within eDiscovery to identify sensitive terms or behaviors, such as:

resign, job offer, backup, personal email, send to home, leaving soon, remotely wipe, compressed, file extensions commonly used for staging or exfiltration: .7z, .rar, .pst, .tar.gz, .gpg, or repeated references to external tools (e.g., “WeTransfer”, “Dropbox”, “Telegram”).

  • Targeted User Investigation: Investigate specific users flagged by UEBA, DLP, or HR triggers. Use Purview to search for mailbox forwarding rules or unusual email recipients, identify OneDrive or SharePoint activity involving external users or personal accounts, and retrieve deleted messages or files still available in preservation hold.
  • Communication Timeline Reconstruction: Use eDiscovery to build a timeline of internal communications and file interactions around suspicious dates—e.g., just before resignation, travel, or privileged access escalations.
  • Multi-Source Correlation: Cross-reference results from Exchange, Teams, OneDrive, and SharePoint in a single case. Link content types and time windows to identify coordinated behavior or quiet staging across services.

 

Indicators (via eDiscovery Results):

  • Discovery of sensitive files emailed to non-corporate domains.
  • Large compressed archives sent or shared shortly before account deactivation.
  • Coordinated message themes among multiple insiders (e.g., disgruntlement, collusion).
  • Use of keywords suggesting obfuscation, retaliation, or planned exit.
  • Evidence of Teams conversations involving encouragement or normalization of data misuse.

Sections

ID Name Description
AF030Message Deletion

The subject deletes digital communication records in order to remove evidence of prior activity, coordination, or intent. These records may include messages exchanged through collaboration platforms, internal messaging systems, or external communication applications.

 

Communication artifacts often provide investigators with critical context surrounding insider events, including planning, intent, and relationships between individuals. Deleting these records can reduce the available evidentiary timeline and hinder reconstruction of events.

 

Message deletion may occur before, during, or after an infringement. In some cases, subjects remove messages immediately after sending them to eliminate records of inappropriate requests or instructions. In other cases, deletion occurs after an alert, disciplinary action, or investigation has begun.

 

Because communication platforms often retain administrative logs of message deletion events, the act of deleting messages may itself become a significant investigative indicator.

PR041Credential Collection

A subject collects, copies, retrieves, exports, records, or stages credentials, secrets, keys, certificates, tokens, or other authentication material in preparation for later access or misuse. This behavior may involve credentials assigned to the subject, credentials assigned to another individual, shared credentials, service account credentials, or authentication material discovered in exposed locations such as tickets, repositories, documentation, configuration files, scripts, password managers, or secrets vaults.

 

Credential collection becomes a preparatory concern when the subject’s handling of authentication material exceeds their legitimate operational need or indicates future use outside approved access processes. The behavior may include saving credentials to local files, screenshots, notes, spreadsheets, personal password managers, clipboard history, removable media, or other locations where they can be reused later.

 

This preparation may precede unauthorized access, internal credential sharing, privilege misuse, data collection, sabotage, or anti-forensic measures to mislead attribution.

PR055Collaborator Recruitment

A subject seeks another person’s knowing participation in a planned or continuing infringement, or in concealing associated activity. The requested assistance may involve obtaining access or information, identifying buyers, approving or executing transactions, performing technical actions, recruiting additional participants, or frustrating detection or investigation. The subject may approach the person directly or through an intermediary, including through organizational communications, personal messaging, telephone conversations, or in-person interactions. Recruitment may involve an offered benefit, a reciprocal arrangement, an appeal to shared objectives, or pressure to participate.

 

The defining behavior is an attempt to enlist another person with awareness of the unauthorized purpose, rather than obtaining unwitting assistance through a concealed or misrepresented purpose. The approach does not need to succeed: it may be accepted, refused, reported, or left unanswered. Investigators should establish the assistance requested, the improper purpose communicated, any offered benefit or applied pressure, and the recipient’s response. Recruitment, agreement, and subsequent assistance should be established separately. Ordinary collaboration, legitimate reporting, and routine instructions to an already established participant do not independently establish recruitment.

AF030.001Deletion of Corporate Communication Messages

The subject deletes messages from organization-managed communication platforms such as enterprise collaboration tools, internal messaging systems, or other corporate communication environments.

 

These platforms commonly contain operational discussions, requests for information, coordination between staff, or exchanges relating to sensitive work activities. Deleting messages from these systems may remove evidence of policy violations, improper instructions, or coordination with other individuals.

 

In many enterprise platforms, message deletion events generate administrative audit artifacts. While the message content may no longer be visible to users, deletion activity can often still be identified through platform audit logs, retention systems, or administrative investigation tools.

AF030.003Use of Disappearing or Self-Deleting Messages

A subject enables or uses a communication feature that automatically deletes messages after they are read, after a defined period, or when a conversation is closed, with the intention of reducing the communication evidence available to investigators.

 

The subject may use disappearing-message functionality within an approved corporate platform or through a non-corporate messaging application. Automatic deletion may be configured for an individual conversation, group, channel, workspace, or account. The subject may also change an existing conversation from persistent retention to temporary retention before exchanging information connected to an infringement.

 

This behavior differs from the manual deletion of corporate or non-corporate messages because the removal mechanism is established before or during the communication. Messages may disappear without a separate deletion action being performed after each message is sent.

 

Investigators should examine when the disappearing-message setting was enabled, who enabled it, the configured retention period, which participants were involved, and whether the setting was changed shortly before sensitive or suspicious communications occurred. The ordinary availability of an ephemeral messaging feature does not establish anti-forensic intent; classification should require evidence that the feature was deliberately used to reduce investigative visibility.

AF030.004Bulk Deletion of Message History

A subject deletes a substantial volume of messages, conversations, threads, channels, or communication history to remove or materially reduce the records available for investigation.

 

Bulk deletion may involve selecting and deleting multiple messages, repeatedly deleting individual messages within a short period, clearing an entire conversation, removing channel history, deleting archived communications, or using scripts, administrative tools, application programming interfaces, or automation to remove content at scale.

 

The behavior may occur after the subject becomes aware of an investigation, disciplinary process, access review, audit, legal dispute, or anticipated offboarding. It may also occur immediately before the subject conducts another infringement where prior communications could reveal planning, coordination, relationships, or intent.

 

The significance of bulk deletion should be assessed against the subject’s normal messaging activity, the amount of content removed, the time period affected, the platforms involved, and whether the deleted communications related to known subjects, external parties, sensitive projects, or active investigations.

 

Investigators should identify deletion event volume, timestamps, conversation identifiers, affected participants, client or application source, administrative actions, and any corresponding data preserved through retention or legal-hold systems.

AF030.005Administrative Deletion of Communication Messages

A subject uses administrative, moderation, ownership, compliance, or delegated platform privileges to delete messages created by another subject or to remove communication records from a shared organizational environment.

 

The subject may delete individual messages, conversation threads, channel content, direct-message history, group discussions, or entire communication spaces. Because the subject acts through an elevated or delegated role, the deletion may affect evidence belonging to several participants and may remove communications that the original author could not delete themselves.

 

This behavior may be used to conceal improper instructions, remove evidence of collusion, suppress complaints, protect another subject, or interfere with an active investigation. The administrative action may appear legitimate where the subject normally manages inappropriate content, retention, moderation, or workspace administration.

 

Investigators should assess whether the deletion was supported by an approved moderation, legal, records-management, or operational requirement. Relevant evidence includes the administrative identity used, the original message author, affected participants, deletion reason, approval records, platform audit logs, retention configuration, and the relationship between the deleting subject and those whose messages were removed.

 

The use of administrative privileges alone does not establish anti-forensic conduct. Classification should require evidence that the deletion was unauthorized or intended to remove evidence relevant to an insider event.

AF030.006Deletion of Communication Containers

A subject deletes a channel, group, workspace, conversation, mailbox folder, discussion board, or other communication container to remove the messages and associated context held within it.

 

Deleting a communication container may remove or obscure a larger body of evidence than deleting individual messages. The affected records may include message content, participant lists, timestamps, thread relationships, attachments, reactions, membership changes, and links to other organizational material.

 

The subject may delete the container after communications associated with an infringement have concluded, after participants have left the group, or after the subject becomes aware that the communication environment may be reviewed. They may also rename, archive, or move the container before deletion to make it more difficult to identify.

 

Investigators should establish who created, owned, administered, archived, and deleted the container; when the deletion occurred; which participants and messages were affected; and whether the activity followed an alert, complaint, investigation, or other relevant event. Platform audit records, retention systems, backups, legal holds, exports, and participant devices may allow the deleted content or surrounding metadata to be reconstructed.

IF016.014Acceptance of Bribes or Kickbacks

A subject knowingly accepts money or another financial or material benefit in exchange for misusing entrusted access, information, authority, or an organizational process. The benefit may be received directly or provided to another person or entity at the subject’s direction. The arrangement may involve favorable supplier selection, approval of improper payments, unauthorized disclosure of information, provision of access, or circumvention of an organizational requirement. The benefit may be provided before or after the associated misuse as part of the arrangement.

 

The defining behavior is the knowing acceptance of a benefit linked to the misuse of the subject’s organizational role, rather than the source of the payment or whether organizational funds were directly diverted. Investigators should establish the benefit, its provider and intended beneficiary, the associated request or agreement, and the relevant organizational actions. An offered inducement that the subject refuses, an unexplained payment, or an authorized gift does not independently establish this behavior. Acceptance of the benefit and completion of the associated misuse should be established separately.

PR055.001Insider Collaborator Recruitment

A subject seeks to recruit another person who currently has, or previously had, authorized access to the affected organization’s resources to knowingly assist an infringement or its concealment. The requested assistance may draw on that person’s access, organizational knowledge, decision-making authority, operational responsibilities, or trusted relationships. This may involve obtaining restricted information, providing credentials or physical entry, approving improper transactions, making unauthorized changes, suppressing scrutiny, or recruiting additional participants.

 

The person approached may be a colleague, manager, direct report, former member of the organization, or trusted third-party personnel. Investigators should establish the person’s relationship with the organization, the assistance sought, and whether the subject communicated its unauthorized purpose. Recruitment of a former member does not establish that they retain access, and recruitment of a privileged individual does not establish that their privileges were subsequently used. A managerial instruction or request for assistance should not be treated as knowing recruitment solely because it later contributes to an infringement.

PR055.002External Collaborator Recruitment

A subject seeks to recruit a person outside the affected organization’s current or former authorized-access population to knowingly assist an infringement or its concealment. The requested assistance may involve identifying or acting as a buyer for organizational information, arranging unauthorized transactions, supplying technical capabilities, providing infrastructure, introducing further participants, or receiving and handling information, assets, or proceeds. The subject may approach an existing personal or professional contact, seek an introduction through an intermediary, or contact a previously unknown person.

 

The distinguishing feature is the recruitment of external participation in the unauthorized activity, rather than ordinary engagement with an external service provider or information recipient. Investigators should establish the role proposed, the improper purpose communicated, the person’s response, and any agreed terms or subsequent assistance. A person who unknowingly provides an otherwise legitimate service should not be classified as a recruited collaborator. Contact with an external party, an introduction, or an unexplained payment does not independently establish recruitment.