• ID: DT051
  • Created: 08th June 2024
  • Updated: 23rd October 2025
  • Platforms: WindowsLinuxMacOS
  • MITRE ATT&CK®: DS0038
  • Contributor: The ITM Team

DNS Logging

Logging DNS requests made by corporate devices can assist with identifying what web resources a system has attempted to or successfully accessed.

Sections

ID Name Description
ME006Web Access

A subject has the ability to access websites and web-based services through an organizational device. This capability may provide access to external communication platforms, personal email, cloud storage services, code repositories, online note-taking applications, generative artificial intelligence platforms, and other internet-accessible resources.

 

Web access may enable the subject to communicate with external parties, retrieve information, upload or download files, store content remotely, or interact with services outside the organization's direct control. The functionality available depends on the websites accessed, the subject's authentication permissions, and any restrictions imposed by organizational network or browser security controls.

 

The availability of unrestricted or insufficiently controlled web access may provide opportunities for unauthorized information disclosure, external collaboration, or other infringements conducted through legitimate web services.

IF001Exfiltration via Web Service

A subject exfiltrates organizational information by transferring it to an external web-based service outside authorized organizational controls. This may involve uploading files, submitting information through web interfaces, publishing content to online repositories, or transmitting data to external service endpoints.

 

The subject may use cloud storage services, code repositories, collaboration platforms, file-sharing services, generative artificial intelligence platforms, note-taking applications, text storage sites, or webhooks to transfer sensitive organizational information. These services may provide externally accessible storage, automated data processing, or communication channels through which the information can be disclosed or retained.

 

Exfiltration through web services may occur using legitimately available applications and standard encrypted web connections, potentially reducing the visibility of unauthorized transfers. The defining infringement is the unauthorized transmission or disclosure of organizational information to the external service, regardless of whether the subject subsequently retrieves it.

IF027Installing Malicious Software

The subject deliberately or inadvertently introduces malicious software (commonly referred to as malware) into the organization’s environment. This may occur via manual execution, automated dropper delivery, browser‑based compromise, USB usage, or sideloading through legitimate processes. Malicious software includes trojans, keyloggers, ransomware, credential stealers, remote access tools (RATs), persistence frameworks, or other payloads designed to cause harm, exfiltrate data, degrade systems, or maintain unauthorized control.

 

Installation of malicious software represents a high-severity infringement, regardless of whether the subject's intent was deliberate or negligent. In some cases, malware introduction is the culmination of prior behavioral drift (e.g. installing unapproved tools or disabling security controls), while in others it may signal malicious preparation or active compromise.

 

This Section is distinct from general “Installing Unapproved Software”, which covers non‑malicious or policy-violating tools. Here, the software itself is malicious in purpose or impact, even if delivered under benign pretenses.

PR036Hardware-Based Remote Access (IP-KVM)

A subject deploys a hardware-based remote access device, typically an IP-KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse over IP) system, to remotely interact with a workstation or server through its physical interfaces.

 

These devices connect directly to the system’s video output (HDMI or DisplayPort) and USB ports, capturing the display signal while injecting keyboard and mouse input remotely. The device presents itself to the operating system as standard USB Human Interface Devices (HID), such as a generic keyboard and mouse, allowing the subject to interact with the system as though physically present at the console.

 

Because the interaction occurs through physical interface emulation rather than installed software, activity generated through the device appears as local console input to the operating system. This can bypass controls designed to detect or restrict software-based remote access tools such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or third-party remote administration platforms.

 

Many IP-KVM devices provide independent network connectivity, including Ethernet, Wi-Fi, or cellular access, allowing the subject to maintain remote interaction with the system through an external management interface. When used in this manner, the remote session may not traverse corporate remote access infrastructure or generate conventional remote access/network logs.

 

While these devices have legitimate uses in system administration, hardware labs, and data center environments, a subject may deploy them covertly to maintain persistent remote access to a system without installing software or triggering typical remote access monitoring or network controls.

 

Within the Insider Threat Matrix, this behavior represents preparatory activity, as it establishes a covert remote control capability that may later enable unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or system manipulation.

PR056Offering Insider Services to Third Parties

A subject actively seeks opportunities to participate in an infringement on behalf of an external party by advertising, offering, or communicating their willingness to misuse organizational access, information, or position of trust. This may involve posting on underground forums, responding to recruitment advertisements, or approaching individuals through social media, messaging platforms, or other communication channels.

 

The subject may disclose their employment position, access privileges, or potential capabilities to attract interested parties, negotiate compensation, or establish arrangements for subsequent unauthorized activity.

ME006.001Webmail

A subject can access personal webmail services in a browser.

ME006.002Cloud Storage Websites

A subject has access to web-based cloud storage services that enable files and other information to be uploaded, stored, retrieved, or shared through an internet browser. These services may include personal or organizational storage accounts, publicly accessible file-sharing platforms, or other externally hosted storage environments.

 

Cloud storage websites may enable the subject to transfer organizational information to remotely accessible storage, generate external sharing links, or retrieve previously uploaded files from another device or location. Depending on the service's configuration and organizational security controls, these capabilities may facilitate unauthorized data transfers or the storage of sensitive information outside approved organizational environments.

ME006.003Inappropriate Websites

A subject can access websites containing inappropriate content.

ME006.004Note-Taking Websites

A subject can access external note-taking websites.

ME006.005Messenger Services

A subject can access external messenger web-applications with the ability to transmit data and/or files.

IF001.001Exfiltration via Cloud Storage

A subject uses a cloud storage service, such as Dropbox, OneDrive, or Google Drive to exfiltrate data. They will then access that service again on another device to retrieve the data. Examples include (URLs have been sanitized):

  • hxxps://www.dropbox[.]com
  • hxxps://drive.google[.]com
  • hxxps://onedrive.live[.]com
  • hxxps://mega[.]nz
  • hxxps://www.icloud[.]com/iclouddrive
  • hxxps://www.pcloud[.]com
ME006.006Code Repositories

A subject has access to web-based source code repositories and development platforms that enable the storage, retrieval, management, and sharing of software source code and associated project information. These services may include platforms such as GitHub, GitLab, or Bitbucket, which support repository browsing, file uploads, version control, and collaboration with other individuals.

 

Access to code repositories may enable the subject to retrieve proprietary source code, inspect development history, access project documentation, or upload organizational information to repositories outside approved environments. Depending on the permissions available, the subject may also be capable of creating repositories, modifying stored content, or granting access to external collaborators.

 

These capabilities may facilitate unauthorized disclosure of intellectual property, sensitive configuration information, or other organizational data where repository access and sharing are insufficiently restricted.

AF004.001Clear Chrome Artifacts

A subject clears Google Chrome browser artifacts to hide evidence of their activities, such as visited websites, cache, cookies, and download history.

AF004.003Clear Firefox Artifacts

A subject clears Mozilla Firefox browser artifacts to hide evidence of their activities, such as visited websites, cache, cookies, and download history.

AF004.002Clear Edge Artifacts

A subject clears Microsoft Edge browser artifacts to hide evidence of their activities, such as visited websites, cache, cookies, and download history.

ME006.007Text Storage Websites

A subject can access external text storage websites, such as Pastebin.

AF018.003Canary Tokens

A subject uses files with canary tokens as a tripwire mechanism to detect the presence of security personnel or investigation activities within a compromised environment. This method involves strategically placing files embedded with special identifiers (canary tokens) that trigger alerts when accessed. For example:

 

The subject creates files containing canary tokens—unique identifiers that generate an alert when they are accessed, opened, or modified. These files can appear as regular documents, logs, configurations, or other items that might attract the attention of an investigator during a security response.

 

The subject strategically places these files in various locations within the environment:

  • Endpoints: Files with canary tokens are stored in directories where digital forensics or malware analysis is likely to occur, such as system logs, user data directories, or registry entries.
  • Cloud Storage: The files are uploaded to cloud storage buckets, virtual machines, or application databases where security teams might search for indicators of compromise.
  • Network Shares: Shared drives and network locations where forensic investigators or security tools may perform scans.

 

Once in place, the canary token within each file serves as a silent tripwire. The token monitors for access and automatically triggers an alert if an action is detected:

  • Access Detection: If a security tool, administrator, or investigator attempts to open, modify, or copy the file, the embedded canary token sends an alert to an external server controlled by the subject.
  • Network Traffic: The token can initiate an outbound network request (e.g., HTTP, DNS) to a specified location, notifying the subject of the exact time and environment where the access occurred.
  • Behavior Analysis: The subject might include multiple canary files, each with unique tokens, to identify the pattern of investigation, such as the sequence of directories accessed or specific file types of interest to the security team.

 

Upon receiving an alert from a triggered canary token, the subject can take immediate steps to evade detection:

  • Alert the Subject: The canary token sends a covert signal to the subject's designated server or communication channel, notifying them of the potential investigation.
  • Halt Malicious Activity: The subject can use this warning to suspend ongoing malicious actions, such as data exfiltration or command-and-control communications, to avoid further detection.
  • Clean Up Evidence: Scripts can be triggered to delete or alter logs, remove incriminating files, or revert system configurations to their original state, complicating any forensic investigation.
  • Feign Normalcy: The subject can restore or disguise compromised systems to appear as though nothing suspicious has occurred, minimizing signs of tampering.

 

By using files with canary tokens as tripwires, a subject can gain early warning of investigative actions and respond quickly to avoid exposure. This tactic allows them to outmaneuver standard security investigations by leveraging silent alerts that inform them of potential security team activity.

IF001.002Exfiltration via Code Repository

A subject uses a code repository service, such as GitHub, to exfiltrate data. They will then access that service again on another device to retrieve the data. Examples include (URLs have been sanitized):

  • hxxps://github[.]com
  • hxxps://gitlab[.]com
  • hxxps://bitbucket[.]org
  • hxxps://sourceforge[.]net
  • hxxps://aws.amazon[.]com/codecommit
IF001.005Exfiltration via Note-Taking Web Services

A subject uploads confidential organization data to a note-taking web service, such as Evernote. The subject can then access the confidential data outside of the organization from another device. Examples include (URLs have been sanitized):

  • hxxps://www.evernote[.]com
  • hxxps://keep.google[.]com
  • hxxps://www.notion[.]so
  • hxxps://www.onenote[.]com
  • hxxps://notebook.zoho[.]com
IF001.003Exfiltration via Text Storage Sites

A subject uses a text storage service, such as Pastebin, to exfiltrate data. They will then access that service again on another device to retrieve the data. Examples include (URLs have been sanitized):

  • hxxps://pastebin[.]com
  • hxxps://hastebin[.]com
  • hxxps://privatebin[.]net
  • hxxps://controlc[.]com
  • hxxps://rentry[.]co
  • hxxps://dpaste[.]org
IF010.002Exfiltration via Personal Email

A subject exfiltrates organizational information using a personal email account or another mailbox accessible to them, either through an installed email application or webmail. The information may be transmitted to an external recipient or retained within the mailbox for subsequent unauthorized retrieval.

PR026.002Remote Desktop Web Access

The subject initiates or configures access to a system using Remote Desktop or Remote Assistance via a web browser interface, often through third-party tools or services (e.g., LogMeIn, AnyDesk, Chrome Remote Desktop, Microsoft RD Web Access). This behavior may indicate preparatory actions to facilitate unauthorized remote access, either for a co-conspirator, a secondary device, or future remote exfiltration. Unlike traditional RDP clients, browser-based remote access methods may bypass endpoint controls and often operate over HTTPS, making detection more difficult with traditional monitoring.

 

This method may be used when traditional RDP clients are blocked or monitored, or when the subject intends to evade installed software policies and gain access through externally hosted portals. While some web-based tools require agents to be installed on the target machine, others permit remote viewing or interaction without full installation, particularly when configured in advance.

IF001.007Exfiltration via Collaboration Platform

A subject uses a cloud collaboration platform, such as Slack, Google Docs, Atlassian Confluence, or Microsoft 365 Online, to exfiltrate data. They will then access that service again on another device to retrieve the data. Examples include (URLs have been sanitized):

 

  • hxxps://docs.google[.]com
    hxxps://*.slack[.]com (* represents a wildcard, where a workspace name would be present)
    hxxps://word.cloud[.]microsoft
    hxxps://excel.cloud[.]Microsoft
  • hxxps://powerpoint.cloud[.]Microsoft
  • hxxps://*.atlassian[.]net/wiki/ (* represents a wildcard, where a workspace name would be present)
IF009.007Installation of Unapproved Browser Extensions

The subject installs browser extensions on a managed device that have not been approved, vetted, or distributed via sanctioned organizational channels. These may include productivity tools, automation agents, data scrapers, content manipulators, or AI-enhanced interfaces. Installations typically originate from GitHub repositories, private developer sites, shared file storage, or sideloading tools that bypass enterprise browser controls.

 

Unapproved extensions introduce unmonitored execution environments directly into the subject’s browser, enabling silent access to sensitive web applications, stored credentials, and internal content. Many request expansive permissions (e.g., webRequest, cookies, tabs, clipboardRead) and operate with persistent background scripts that are difficult to detect through normal endpoint monitoring.

 

This behavior violates Acceptable Use Policies and, depending on the extension’s behavior, may also constitute unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or malware introduction. Some extensions—particularly those hosted on GitHub or distributed through Telegram groups or developer forums—have been found to contain obfuscated payloads, embedded credential harvesters, or cryptojacking modules.

 

Examples include:

 

  • Installing a GitHub-hosted ChatGPT sidebar extension that silently logs visited URLs and API keys used in developer consoles.
  • Deploying a YouTube downloader that injects scripts for ad click fraud or SEO manipulation.
  • Using a browser extension to auto-fill forms with personal data, which transmits data to offshore analytics servers.
  • Loading unpacked or custom extensions that disguise themselves as utilities but include base64-encoded malware installers.

 

While subjects may initially claim curiosity or productivity needs, repeated installation of unapproved extensions—especially after prior enforcement—may indicate normalization of risky behavior or active circumvention of controls.

ME001.001Access to Asset Past Termination

The subject accesses a corporate hardware asset, most commonly a laptop or corporate mobile device, after their employment has formally ended. This typically occurs due to gaps in deprovisioning, delayed hardware recovery, or the subject physically retaining the device despite offboarding procedures. Post-termination access may be opportunistic or intentional, and may precede or coincide with data exfiltration, sabotage, or unauthorized continuation of internal access.

 

This sub-section is relevant in cases where the hardware asset is no longer linked to an active identity in HR systems but remains technically functional and capable of network, VPN, or service access. Such access undermines the assumption that termination alone revokes operational capability and may point to procedural drift in IT, HR, or facilities handover workflows.

ME001.002Purchase and Use of Unmanaged Corporate Hardware

The subject purchases a laptop (or similar endpoint) using a corporate payment method but does so outside established procurement and provisioning processes. By bypassing IT and asset management workflows, the subject introduces a corporate-funded but unmanaged device into the environment.

 

Such devices often lack standard security controls—such as endpoint detection and response (EDR), encryption, configuration baselines, or patching—and may not be tracked in asset inventory systems. While the subject may rationalize the purchase as operationally necessary (e.g., urgency, convenience, or perceived lack of IT responsiveness), the result is a sanctioned but invisible device with the potential to bypass monitoring and governance controls.

 

This behavior undermines organizational asset control, complicates investigative attribution, and introduces unmanaged endpoints capable of accessing sensitive networks and data.

IF027.001Infostealer Deployment

The subject deploys credential-harvesting malware (commonly referred to as an infostealer) to extract sensitive authentication material or session artifacts from systems under their control. These payloads are typically configured to capture data from browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data SQLite databases in Chromium-based browsers), password vaults (e.g., KeePass, 1Password), clipboard buffers, Windows Credential Manager, or the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory space.

 

Infostealers may be executed directly via compiled binaries, staged through malicious document macros, or loaded reflectively into memory using PowerShell, .NET assemblies, or process hollowing techniques. Some variants are fileless and reside entirely in memory, while others create persistence via registry keys (e.g., HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run) or scheduled tasks.

 

While often associated with external threat actors, insider deployment of infostealers allows subjects to bypass authentication safeguards, impersonate peers, or exfiltrate internal tokens for later use or sale. In cases where data is not immediately exfiltrated, local staging (e.g., in %AppData%, %Temp%, or encrypted containers) may indicate an intent to transfer data offline or deliver it via alternate channels.

IF027.002Ransomware Deployment

The subject deploys ransomware within the organization’s environment, resulting in the encryption, locking, or destructive alteration of organizational data, systems, or backups. Ransomware used by insiders may be obtained from public repositories, affiliate programs (e.g. RaaS platforms), or compiled independently using commodity builder kits. Unlike external actors who rely on phishing or remote exploitation, insiders often bypass perimeter controls by detonating ransomware from within trusted systems using local access.

 

Ransomware payloads are typically compiled as executables, occasionally obfuscated using packers or crypters to evade detection. Execution may be initiated via command-line, scheduled task, script wrapper, or automated loader. Encryption routines often target common file extensions recursively across accessible volumes, mapped drives, and cloud sync folders. In advanced deployments, the subject may disable volume shadow copies (vssadmin delete shadows) or stop backup agents (net stop) prior to detonation to increase impact.

 

In some insider scenarios, ransomware is executed selectively: targeting specific departments, shares, or systems, rather than broad detonation. This behavior may indicate intent to send a message, sabotage selectively, or avoid attribution. Payment demands may be issued internally, externally, or omitted entirely if disruption is the primary motive.

IF027.003Keylogger Deployment

The subject deploys software designed to record keystrokes entered on an endpoint to capture credentials, sensitive communications, internal documentation, or intellectual property. Keyloggers may be introduced as standalone binaries, embedded within otherwise legitimate tools, or configured through dual-use frameworks (e.g. C++ dropper with keylogging module). In insider scenarios, the deployment is typically local and deliberate, leveraging the subject’s physical access or assigned privileges to bypass existing controls.

 

Keyloggers operate in one of several modes:

 

  • Kernel-based: Install drivers or hook low-level keyboard input APIs (e.g. Kbdclass.sys) to intercept inputs pre-OS.
  • User-mode: Hook Windows APIs (SetWindowsHookEx, GetAsyncKeyState, GetForegroundWindow) to log input tied to active processes or windows.
  • Form grabbers: Intercept browser or GUI form submissions, often bypassing SSL/TLS encryption by logging data pre-submission.
  • Clipboard and screen scrapers: Supplement keylogging with capture of copied content and screenshots for contextual awareness.

 

Captured data is typically stored in encrypted local files (e.g. %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, or hidden directories), periodically exfiltrated via email, FTP, HTTP POST, or external storage.

IF027.004Remote Access Tool (RAT) Deployment

The subject deploys a Remote Access Tool (RAT): a software implant that provides covert, persistent remote control of an endpoint or server—enabling continued unauthorized access, monitoring, or post-employment re-entry. Unlike sanctioned remote administration platforms, RATs are deployed without organizational oversight and are often configured to obfuscate their presence, evade detection, or blend into legitimate activity.

 

RATs deployed by insiders may be off-the-shelf tools (e.g. njRAT, Quasar, Remcos), lightly modified open-source frameworks (e.g. Havoc, Pupy), or commercial-grade products repurposed for unsanctioned use (e.g. AnyDesk, TeamViewer in stealth mode). 

 

Functionality typically includes:

 

  • Full GUI or shell access
  • File system interaction
  • Screenshot and webcam capture
  • Credential harvesting
  • Process and registry manipulation
  • Optional keylogging and persistence modules

 

Deployment methods include manual installation, script-wrapped droppers, DLL side-loading, or execution via LOLBins (mshta, rundll32). Persistence is typically achieved through scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or disguised service installations. In some cases, the RAT may be configured to activate only during specific windows or respond to remote beacons, reducing exposure to detection.

AF029.002Unauthorized VPN Usage

The subject deliberately uses Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology in a manner that circumvents organizational oversight, masking the nature, destination, or content of network activity. This includes installing unapproved VPN clients, as well as reconfiguring sanctioned VPN software to route traffic through unauthorized exit nodes, personal infrastructure, or third-party services not governed by corporate policy.

 

By diverting traffic away from monitored pathways, the subject obstructs standard telemetry collection - evading logging of session destinations, data transfers, or identity-bound usage. This behavior frustrates forensic reconstruction, hinders real-time monitoring, and degrades the reliability of investigative artifacts. Unauthorized VPN usage is an intentional anti-forensics measure aimed at concealing potentially harmful activity behind layers of encrypted and unsanctioned transit.

AF029.003Use of Browser-Based VPN Extensions

The subject installs and activates browser-based VPN or proxy extensions (such as Hola VPN, Browsec, or ZenMate) to anonymize specific web activity while avoiding host-level detection or access restrictions. These lightweight tools require no administrative privileges and often evade traditional endpoint controls, allowing subjects to selectively obscure browsing sessions, bypass content filtering, or access external services undetected.

 

Unlike full-system VPN clients, browser-based VPNs operate at the application layer, making them more difficult to inventory, log, or control using conventional network or endpoint defenses. Their use complicates investigative visibility into user intent, session content, and destination domains, particularly when paired with HTTPS encryption or private browsing modes. This technique represents a form of network anti-forensics intended to obscure subject behavior with minimal system footprint or oversight.

PR018.008Bypassing Network Segmentation

A subject bypasses logical or physical network segmentation controls (such as VLANs, ACLs, security groups, or subnets) in order to obtain unauthorized access to systems, services, or data across trust boundaries. This preparation technique commonly manifests through deliberate configuration changes (e.g., modifying ACLs or VLAN assignments), covert tunneling (e.g., SSH, HTTPS reverse tunnels), rogue device introduction (e.g., unmanaged switches or dual-homed devices), or misuse of trusted services (e.g., remote access platforms or admin automation tools that bridge zones).

 

Such actions are often observable via first-time or anomalous cross-segment flows, management plane configuration logs, 802.1X/NAC anomalies, or long-lived encrypted outbound sessions. These techniques typically exploit privileged access, weak change control, or poor posture enforcement.

 

This behaviour may be motivated by a subject’s attempt to escalate access, stage data for exfiltration, evade oversight, or maintain persistence across environments. It is especially critical in environments with sensitive zoning, such as production-to-dev separations, cloud VPC peerings, or physically segmented OT/ICS networks.

 

Investigators should prioritize telemetry correlation across NetFlow/IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX), EDR, DHCP, and identity systems to attribute cross-zone traffic to known assets and subjects. Preserve infrastructure configuration snapshots and identify whether segmentation was circumvented by direct administrative action, covert bridging, or software-level tunnelling.

IF014.001Modification of DNS Records

The subject creates, deletes, or edits DNS records resulting in harm. Examples include altering MX records to affect the availability of email communication, removing A records to affect the availability of web resources, or altering A records to redirect traffic to an unintended location.

IF001.008Exfiltration via File-Sharing Platform

The subject uploads organizational data to a personal or unauthorized file-sharing platform (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, WeTransfer, MEGA, or similar) to remove it from controlled environments. This technique is commonly used to bypass endpoint restrictions, avoid detection by traditional DLP systems, and facilitate remote access to stolen data. Uploads may occur through browser sessions, desktop clients, or command-line tools, depending on the sophistication of the subject and the controls in place.

 

Investigators should evaluate whether the data transferred was sensitive, proprietary, or otherwise restricted, and assess whether the subject attempted to conceal or stage the transfer using obfuscation or anti-forensics techniques.

ME006.008Generative AI Websites

A subject has access to external generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) websites that allow information to be submitted, processed, analyzed, or transformed through browser-based interfaces. These platforms may support text prompts, document uploads, source code analysis, image processing, or other forms of content generation and manipulation.

 

Generative AI websites may enable the subject to process organizational information using services outside approved enterprise environments. Depending on the platform's capabilities and data handling arrangements, submitted information may be transmitted to external infrastructure, retained in conversation histories, or made accessible through accounts not governed by organizational security controls.

 

This capability may facilitate unauthorized information disclosure or subsequent exfiltration where the subject submits sensitive organizational data to an external AI service. Access to such websites does not, in itself, establish that organizational information has been disclosed.

IF004.009Exfiltration via Command-and-Control Channel

A subject exfiltrates organizational data through an existing command-and-control channel established by malware, a remote access tool, backdoor, implant, agent, or unauthorized remote administration framework. The same communication pathway used to issue commands, maintain remote access, or control the compromised system is also used to transmit data outside the organization’s control.

 

This infringement may involve files, credentials, screenshots, system information, database exports, or other collected data being sent over HTTP/S, TCP, DNS, encrypted tunnels, or proprietary remote access protocols. Because the exfiltration occurs over an already established control channel, the data transfer may appear as part of existing outbound traffic rather than a separate upload or file-sharing event.

AF029.005Unauthorized Encrypted DNS Usage

A subject configures or uses an unauthorized encrypted Domain Name System (DNS) service to prevent organizational infrastructure from observing, recording, filtering, or enforcing domain-resolution activity.

 

Encrypted DNS protocols, including DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over Transport Layer Security (DoT), protect DNS queries from observation while they travel between the endpoint and the resolver. Although these protocols have legitimate privacy and security applications, their unauthorized use can bypass enterprise DNS servers, DNS filtering, threat-intelligence controls, and domain-level investigative logging.

 

The subject may enable encrypted DNS through browser settings, operating-system configuration, mobile applications, command-line utilities, or third-party resolver software. They may also select a public or personally controlled resolver that is not governed by the organization.

 

This behavior reduces investigators’ ability to determine which domains the subject attempted to access. Network telemetry may show only an encrypted connection to the resolver rather than the individual domain queries conducted through it. Unauthorized encrypted DNS may be used to conceal access to prohibited services, external infrastructure, anonymization platforms, remote-access services, or data-transfer destinations.

 

The use of encrypted DNS alone does not establish improper intent. Investigators should determine whether the resolver was approved, whether organizational DNS controls were deliberately bypassed, and whether the activity coincided with another infringement or anti-forensics behavior.

AF029.007Destination Disguising

A subject causes network activity to appear directed toward an approved, trusted, or otherwise benign service while the underlying communication is routed to a different destination.

 

Destination disguising may exploit differences between the hostname, certificate, application request, routing layer, or infrastructure used to establish and process a connection. To organizational monitoring, the traffic may initially appear associated with a common cloud, content-delivery, hosting, or software service, while the actual request is forwarded to infrastructure controlled by or selected by the subject.

 

Methods may include domain fronting, manipulation of host headers, use of shared content-delivery infrastructure, concealed redirects, or the abuse of legitimate cloud services as intermediary routing points. The subject may select these methods because blocking the apparent destination would disrupt legitimate organizational activity.

 

This behavior can frustrate domain filtering, proxy review, firewall enforcement, and investigative attribution. Security controls may record the visible front domain or shared infrastructure address without identifying the concealed destination or service reached through it.

 

Investigators should examine Domain Name System records, Transport Layer Security handshake information, Server Name Indication values, certificates, Hypertext Transfer Protocol headers, proxy records, redirects, and destination infrastructure. Differences between these sources may indicate that the apparent and actual destinations do not align.

 

The use of shared cloud or content-delivery infrastructure does not itself establish obfuscation. Classification should require evidence that the subject deliberately used the discrepancy to conceal the true destination or evade organizational monitoring.

PR056.001Advertising Insider Services

A subject proactively advertises or offers their willingness to misuse organizational access, information, resources, or position of trust to facilitate an infringement on behalf of a third party. This may involve publishing offers on underground forums, posting on social media, or directly approaching external individuals or groups seeking opportunities for unauthorized activity.

 

The subject may disclose details of their organizational affiliation, access privileges, technical capabilities, or the types of information and systems available to them to attract interested parties. Such activity may involve soliciting financial compensation, proposing arrangements for collaboration, or offering access to organizational resources in exchange for other benefits.

 

The defining characteristic is that the subject initiates the solicitation, positioning themselves as a potential participant in an infringement before any formal agreement or unauthorized activity has occurred.

PR056.002Responding to Insider Recruitment Opportunities

A subject knowingly responds to recruitment advertisements, solicitations, or offers from third parties seeking individuals willing to misuse their organizational access, information, resources, or position of trust to facilitate an infringement. These opportunities may be encountered on underground forums, social media platforms, messaging services, or through direct communications from external individuals.

 

The subject may initiate contact with the recruiting party, express interest in participating, disclose their organizational affiliation or access capabilities, or discuss potential activities, compensation, and conditions of involvement. Engagement may progress from an initial expression of interest to more detailed discussions concerning the subject's ability to facilitate unauthorized access, information disclosure, sabotage, or other infringements.

 

The defining characteristic is the subject's voluntary engagement with an existing recruitment opportunity, rather than independently advertising their services. The behavior may constitute preparatory activity even where no agreement is reached or subsequent infringement occurs.